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1 Introduction
In relation with the analysis of criteria for comparing allocations to a finite
society, Hammond’s [10] characterization of the leximin ordering is based on
anonymity, the strong Pareto axiom, and a principle now called Hammond
Equity. It has been recently proven that in the presence of anonymity and
the strong Pareto principle, Hammond Equity is equivalent to a liberal non-
interference property called Harm Principle, henceforth HP (cf., Mariotti and
Veneziani [14]). The generic idea of liberal non-interference is that an indi-
vidual has the right to make society remain passive in all circumstances of
change in her welfare, provided that the welfare of no other individual is af-
fected. In particular, when ‘change’ means only damage the Harm Principle
is obtained, and when it means only benefit a ‘dual’ property called the Indi-
vidual Benefit Principle, henceforth IBP, comes forward. Thus as the authors
acknowledge, the alternative characterization of the leximin social ranking in
[14] seems fairly surprising since HP does not embody any egalitarian consid-
eration while Hammond Equity is a strongly egalitarian property. In related
lines of work, extensions of the analysis to the case of the leximax criterion and
also to the case of infinitely-lived societies appear in Mariotti and Veneziani
[16] and Lombardi and Veneziani [12,13]. They appeal to the finite- or infinite-
dimensional versions of either HP (leximin) or IBP (leximax). In particular,
preference continuities permit to characterize infinite extensions of the leximin
criterion both on the basis of Hammond Equity (cf., Asheim and Tungodden
[4]) and of adapted versions of HP. Nevertheless, [13] shows that in the eval-
uation of infinitely long streams by orderings, anonymity, the strong Pareto
axiom, and preference continuity properties are incompatible with full non-
interference –understood as the combination of the spirits of HP and IBP.
Restricting ourselves to a finite economy, Mariotti and Veneziani [16] prove
that a fully liberal non-interfering view of the society leads to dictatorship if
the weak Pareto principle is imposed.
In this paper we first prove that the latter impossibility result vanishes
when we extend the horizon to infinity (cf., Section 3). To be more precise,
in the infinite setting non-dictatorship (resp., anonymity) is compatible with
full non-interference even if we restrict ourselves to using monotonic social
orderings with the weak Pareto property (resp., a restricted version of the
weak Pareto property) and some minimal equity requirement. Afterwards we
explore the consequences of imposing weak standard continuity properties to
non-interfering criteria (cf., Section 4). For the case of a finite society, it is
implicitly known that topological continuity is incompatible with equity and
efficiency in the presence of liberal non-interference. A very direct coarse ar-
gument derives from the fact that the leximin (resp., leximax) criterion for
comparing allocations in a finite society lacks upper (resp., lower) semiconti-
nuity with respect to the sup topology. From this it is trivial that no social
ordering can verify anonymity, the strong Pareto axiom, and HP (resp., IBP)
under upper (resp., lower) semicontinuity with respect to the sup topology.
We provide more accurate reasons for the disclosed conflict by proving that
3
anonymity and transitivity play no role in the aforementioned incompatibil-
ities, and also that impossibility remains when an extremely mild technical
condition replaces strong Pareto instead. Turning now to the infinite case, the
situation is similar. In particular we prove that semicontinuity imposes bounds
even on non-interfering criteria that satisfy neither transitivity nor the full
strength of the completeness axiom, for they must violate a very relaxed ver-
sion of the Pareto postulate that only affects comparisons between eventually
constant and coincident streams. Renouncing completeness in this result is
not a merely formal move since many of the social welfare relations that are
preeminent in the intergenerational analyses only verify the restricted version
of completeness that we use. Then we elaborate on less demanding views of
non-interference that scarcely provide some routes of escape to the generalised
impossibilities that arise. We end up our paper with some conclusions.
2 Notation and axioms
A social welfare relation (SWR) is a binary relation < on X = [0, 1]n with
n ∈ N ∪ {∞}. When n ∈ N it is interpreted as the cardinality of a finite set
of agents. When n = ∞, we interpret that there is a countably infinite set
of agents N or of generations, and X represents a domain of bounded utility
sequences or infinite-horizon utility streams. Unless we state otherwise, it is
assumed that < is reflexive. Its asymmetric factor is denoted by  (i.e., x  y
iff x < y but not y < x), and its symmetric factor is denoted by ∼ (i.e., x ∼ y
iff x < y and y < x). If < is an ordering (i.e., complete and transitive) then
we call it a social welfare ordering or SWO.
We develop the notation for the case when X = [0, 1]N. Its elements
x = (x1, ..., xn, .......) ∈ X list the allocations to agents/generations if x is
chosen. By (y)con we mean the constant sequence (y, y, ....), and similarly
(x1, ..., xk, (y)con) = (x1, ..., xk, y, y, ....) denotes an eventually constant se-
quence. Denote by 1xT = (x1, ..., xT ) and T+1x = (xT+1, xT+2, ....) the T -
head and the T -tail of x ∈ X, thus x = 1x = (1xn, n+1x) for each n ∈ N.
When the intergenerational terminology is adopted, the first component or
generation is often called the present. We say that the streams x,y ∈ X are
eventually coincident if there is j ∈ N such that xi = yi for each i > j.
We write x > y if xi > yi for each i = 1, 2, ..., and x  y if xi > yi for
each i = 1, 2, .... Also, x > y means x > y and x 6= y.
We are concerned with axioms of different nature for SWRs. We state them
for X = [0, 1]N but they can be easily regarded as axioms on X = [0, 1]n with
n ∈ N too, as is dutifully clarified along the exposition when needed.
Firstly we introduce equity axioms of two different classes for a SWR <
on X = [0, 1]N. Anonymity is the usual “equal treatment of all generations”
postulate à-la-Sidgwick and Diamond.
Axiom AN (Anonymity). For all x,y ∈ X, if there exist i, j ∈ N such
that xi = yj and xj = yi, and for k ∈ N− {i, j}, xk = yk, then x ∼ y.
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We now recall a consequentialist equity axiom that implements preference
for egalitarian allocations of utilities among generations. Axiom HE below
states that in case of a conflict between two generations, every other generation
being as well off, the stream where the least favoured generation is better off
must be weakly preferred.
Axiom HE (Hammond Equity). If x,y ∈ X are such that xj > yj > yk >
xk for some j, k ∈ N, and xt = yt when j 6= t 6= k, then y < x.
Further we are concerned with the following axiom that was introduced in
Asheim and Tungodden [5].
Axiom HEF (Hammond Equity for the Future). If x,y ∈ X are such that
x = (x1, (x)con), y = (y1, (y)con) and x1 > y1 > y > x, then y < x.
HEF states the following ethical restriction on the ranking of streams where
the level of utility is constant from the second period on and the present
generation is better-off than the future: If the sacrifice by the present conveys a
higher utility for all future generations, then such trade off is weakly preferred.
In a different vein, Mariotti and Veneziani [16,14] introduce non-interference
conditions in the context of a finite society. Under additional requirements
they are intimately related to HE (cf., Mariotti and Veneziani [14, p. 127]).
We proceed to recall their infinite counterparts, which are extensively analyzed
in Lombardi and Veneziani [12,13]. Their respective versions for finite-length
streams are the same except in that the restriction of the thesis to eventually
coincident vectors does not apply.
Axiom HP (Harm Principle). Suppose x,y ∈ X are eventually coincident
and x  y. Consider two streams x′,y′ ∈ X such that: for some i ∈ N, j 6= i
implies x′j = xj and y
′
j = yj . If x
′
i < xi and y
′






Axiom IBP (Individual Benefit Principle). Suppose x,y ∈ X are even-
tually coincident and x  y. Consider two streams x′,y′ ∈ X such that: for





Quoting from [16], the core of these non-interference principles is the fol-
lowing idea (we adopt the intergenerational terminology): changes in one gen-
eration’s welfare that leave all other generations unaffected should not be a
motive for penalising that generation in the social judgement, whether the
change involves a damage (HP) or a benefit (IBP) for that generation. A pe-
nalisation means a switch against its interest in the society’s strict ranking of
the distributions (with respect to the ranking of the original distributions).
This explanation adapts to the other usual interpretations in a direct manner.
Relaxed versions of HP and IBP where the conclusion of the axioms merely
state y′  x′ instead of x′  y′, are respectively called Weak Harm Princi-
ple (WHP) and Weak Individual Benefit Principle (WIBP): v., Mariotti and
Veneziani [16].
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Social evaluations need to account for some kind of efficiency too. Vari-
ous axioms capture the general principle that with respect to a given infinite
utility stream, adequate changes must produce socially better streams if ev-
ery generation is at least as well off after the change. The Weak Dominance
axiom captures the following spirit: Improving the welfare of exactly one gen-
eration suffices to produce a socially better stream. In turn, the Weak Pareto
axiom requests that all generations increase their utility in order to obtain a
socially better stream. The Strong Pareto axiom imposes that if at least one
generation increases its utility then the resulting stream is socially better thus
Strong Pareto and Weak Dominance coincide over sets of finite-length vectors.
Formally:
Axiom WD (Weak Dominance). If x,y ∈ X and there is j ∈ N such that
xj > yj , and xi = yi for all i 6= j, then x  y.
Axiom WP (Weak Pareto). If x,y ∈ X and x y, then x  y.
Axiom SP (Strong Pareto). If x,y ∈ X and x > y then x  y.
Another relaxed form of Strong Pareto that is unrelated both to WP and
WD is the uncontroversial Monotonicity.
Axiom M (Monotonicity). If x,y ∈ X and x > y then x < y.
Observe that SWOs that verify M and WD verify SP too.
Finally, we list some semicontinuity properties for the context X ⊆ RN
and below we discuss how they adapt to the case X ⊆ Rn, n ∈ N:
Axiom RUSC (Restricted upper semicontinuity with respect to the sup
topology). For each x ∈ X eventually constant, {y ∈ X : y < x} is closed with
respect to the sup topology.
Axiom RLSC (Restricted lower semicontinuity with respect to the sup
topology). For each x ∈ X eventually constant, {y ∈ X : x < y} is closed with
respect to the sup topology.
In general, the sup topology is finer than the product topology but when
X ⊆ Rn with n ∈ N, both topologies coincide with the Euclidean topology.
Also in this context, RUSC/RLSC are the ordinary USC/LSC (upper/lower
semicontinuity with respect to the sup topology). As usual, continuity means
the conjunction of upper and lower semicontinuity.
3 The possibility of non-interference with an infinite horizon
In the context of SWOs on allocations to a finite society with two or more
agents, there are linear rankings that verify SP, HP and IBP (e.g., lexicographic
orders) but there are not SWOs that verify WP, WHP, WIBP, and AN because
all SWOs that verify WP, WHP and WIBP are dictatorial by a generation (cf.,
Mariotti and Veneziani [16, Theorem 1]). For example, lexicographic orders are
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dictatorial by the first generation. Such impossibility result implies a simple
Corollary for infinitely-lived societies that uses the following axiom:
Axiom RWD (Restricted Weak Dominance). If x,y ∈ X are eventually
constant, there is j ∈ N such that xj > yj , and xi = yi for all i 6= j, then
x  y.
Corollary 1 There is no SWO on X = [0, 1]N that verifies RWD, WHP,
WIBP, and AN.
Proof If < is a SWO on X = [0, 1]N that verifies RWD, WHP, WIBP, and
AN, then the expression
(x, y) R (x′, y′) iff (x, y, 0con) < (x
′, y′, 0con)
produces a SWO on [0, 1]2 that verifies WP, WHP, WIBP, and AN. This is
against Mariotti and Veneziani [16, Theorem 1]. 
We proceed to further explore the implications of non-interference postu-
lates with an infinite horizon. We appeal to the following non-dictatorship
axioms (cf., Chichilnisky [9], also Sakai [17,18], Asheim et al. [3]) that impose
that the comparisons between pairs of streams do not depend on the welfare
levels of present, resp., future, generations only.
Axiom NDP (Non-Dictatorship of the Present). The following is not true:
If x,y ∈ X are such that x  y , there is i ∈ N for which j > i and z,w ∈ X
imply (1xj , j+1z)  (1yj ,j+1 w).
Axiom NDF (Non-Dictatorship of the Future). The following is not true:
If x,y ∈ X are such that x  y , there is i ∈ N for which j > i and z,w ∈ X
imply (1zj , j+1x)  (1wj , j+1y).
Sakai [18, Propositions 1 and 2] provides the following simple relationships.
Let < be a binary relation on X. If < verifies AN and there are x,y ∈ X such
that x  y then < verifies NDP. If < verifies RWD then < verifies NDF.
In contrast with Corollary 1, Theorem 1 below indicates that the negative
result in Mariotti and Veneziani [16] is overturned when moving to infinite
societies, in the sense that the combination of WP with the strict versions of
the non-interference principles does not result in a dictatorship.
Theorem 1 There are SWOs on X = [0, 1]N that verify M, WP, HEF, HP,
IBP, NDP, and NDF.
Proof We define the following binary relation < on X: x < y if and only
if either lim infn(xn) > lim infn(yn) or (lim infn(xn) = lim infn(yn) and x1 >
y1). This is a lexicographic composition of a long-run criterion and dictatorship
of the present. Thus it is routine to check that < is a complete preorder. Its
asymmetric part is defined by: x  y if and only if either lim infn(xn) >
lim infn(yn) or (lim infn(xn) = lim infn(yn) and x1 > y1).
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In order to prove M, take x,y ∈ X with x > y thus lim infn(xn) >
lim infn(yn). If lim infn(xn) > lim infn(yn) we obtain x  y . If lim infn(xn) =
lim infn(yn) then the fact that x1 > y1 yields x < y .
In order to prove WP, take x,y ∈ X with x  y thus lim infn(xn) >
lim infn(yn). We proceed as above to check x  y .
The proof that < verifies a reinforced version of HEF is direct: If x =
(x1, (x)con), y = (y1, (y)con) and x1 > y1 > y > x then y  x because
lim infn(yn) = y > x = lim infn(xn).
Let us now prove HP. Suppose x,y ∈ X are eventually coincident with
x  y, thus lim infn(xn) = lim infn(yn) and x1 > y1. Consider x′,y′ ∈ X such
that: for some i ∈ N, j 6= i implies x′j = xj and y′j = yj . Since lim infn(x′n) =
lim infn(xn) and lim infn(y
′
n) = lim infn(yn), in case that x
′
i < xi, y
′
i < yi
and y′i < x
′
i then we deduce x
′  y′ irrespective of i being 1 or greater.
The proof that < verifies IBP is analogous to the argument for HP.
Sakai [18, Proposition 1] yields NDP.
Finally, in order to check that there is no dictatorship of the future observe
that if x = (1con),y = (0, 1con) it is true that x  y but for each i > 1 and
j > i, if z = (0con),w = (1con) one has (1wj , j+1y)  (1zj , j+1x). 
Remark 1 We have fixed an exact expression in order to simplify the proof of
Theorem 1. The reader can check that the generation that is looked upon when
the first criterion is not decisive can be chosen in any random manner. More
precisely, take any map ν : [0, 1] −→ N and define uν : X −→ [0, 1]2 according
to uν(x) = (lim infn(xn), xν(lim infn(xn))). If we now define a binary relation
<ν on X by the expression: x <ν y if and only if uν(x) lexicographically
beats uν(y), then a straightforward modification of the argument proves that
<ν verifies the thesis of Theorem 1. In the proof above ν is constantly 1.
Proposition 1 below shows that with respect to the statement of Theorem
1, possibility remains when AN and representability are imposed at the cost
of NDF and of relaxing WP to the following property (cf., Asheim et al. [2]):
Axiom RWP (Restricted Weak Pareto). If x,y ∈ X, x  y and both x
and y are eventually constant, then x  y.
Proposition 1 There are representable SWOs on X = [0, 1]N that verify M,
RWP, HEF, HP, IBP, and AN.
Proof The relation x < y if and only if lim infn(xn) > lim infn(yn) establishes
the fact. Observe that the conditions in the statement imply NDP. 
Remark 2 We do not yet know if possibility remains when NDF is added to
the list of axioms in Proposition 1, irrespective of representability.
In this regard we must emphasize that Theorem 1 is not directly compa-
rable with the result that WP, WHP, WIBP, and AN are incompatible in the
case of finite societies because the anonymity axiom is left aside.
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4 Impossibility results for semicontinuous relations
In this Section we are interested in the implications of topological semicon-
tinuity. We first produce various impossibility results for SWRs with non-
interference properties on X = [0, 1]n, a setting where SP and WD coincide.
Afterwards we show that they naturally translate into results on X = [0, 1]N .
A cardinal variant of the analysis completes this Section.
4.1 The case of a finite society
In this context it is known that AN, SP, and IBP (resp., either HE or HP)
characterize the extensions of the leximax (resp., leximin): cf., Mariotti and
Veneziani [16, Propositions 2, 3]. Let us recall the definitions of these orderings.
For any x ∈ Rn, let x̄ denote the permutation of x whose components x̄1, .., x̄n
are ranked in ascending order. The leximin ordering <LM is defined by: x LM
y if and only if either x̄1 > ȳ1 or there exists l > 1 such that x̄1 = ȳ1, ... ,
x̄l−1 = ȳl−1, x̄l > ȳl. The leximax ordering <LX is defined by: x LX y if and
only if either x̄n > ȳn or there exists l < n such that x̄n = ȳn, ... , x̄l+1 = ȳl+1,
x̄l > ȳl.
It is now trivial that AN, SP, HP, and IBP are incompatible properties for
a SWO on X = [0, 1]n when n > 1. Relaxing SP to WP produces incompat-
ibility too (in fact WP, WHP, and WIBP together entail dictatorship by an
agent, which violates AN), but dropping either HP or IBP instead produces
compatibility. Any dictatorship by an agent proves that the incompatibility
among AN, SP, HP, and IBP is avoided if AN is dropped and SP is relaxed
to M plus WP.
Since the extensions of the leximax (resp., leximin) do not verify lower
(resp., upper) semicontinuity with respect to the sup topology, trivial impos-
sibility consequences follow. 1 To be precise: No SWO on X = [0, 1]n verifies
AN, SP, HP (res., IBP), and USC (resp., LSC). In this Subsection we clarify
the extent of the conflict among non-interference principles, Paretian axioms,
and semicontinuity by proving that (a) AN and transitivity play no role in
such incompatibilities, and (b) if an extremely mild technical condition re-
places WD/SP then we still obtain conflicting axiomatics.
Regarding our first purpose, the following Propositions 2 and 3 are in order:
Proposition 2 There is no complete SWR < on X = [0, 1]n, n ∈ {2, 3, ....},
that verifies WIBP, WD, and LSC.
Proof We prove that the combination of properties in the statement conveys
an absurd conclusion. Let us first show (0, 1, 0, ..., 0) < ( 12 , 1 −
1
i , 0, ..., 0) for




). With respect to
the sup topology, y(i) converges to y = (1, 1
2
). However (1, 0) LX y(i) and y LX (1, 0).




). With respect to the
sup topology, x(i) converges to x = (0, 1
2
). However x(i) LM (0, 1) and (0, 1) LM x.
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each i = 2, 3, .... Suppose the opposite, thus ( 12 , 1−
1
i0
, 0, ..., 0)  (0, 1, 0, ..., 0)
for some i0 ∈ {2, 3, ...}. An appeal to WIBP yields (1, 1 − 1i0 , 0, ..., 0) <
(1 − 1m , 1, 0, ..., 0) for each m = 2, 3, .... Now LSC entails (1, 1 −
1
i0
, 0, ..., 0) <
(1, 1, 0, ..., 0), contradicting WD.
With respect to the sup topology, {( 12 , 1−
1
i , 0, ..., 0)}i converges to (
1
2 , 1, 0, ..., 0)
thus LSC entails (0, 1, 0, ..., 0) < ( 12 , 1, 0, ..., 0), contradicting WD. 
Proposition 3 There is no complete SWR < on X = [0, 1]n, n ∈ {2, 3, ....},
that verifies WHP, WD, and USC.
Proof We prove that the combination of properties in the statement conveys
an absurd conclusion. Let us first show ( 1i ,
1
2 , 0, ..., 0) < (0, 1, 0, ..., 0) for each
i = 2, 3, .... Suppose the opposite, thus (0, 1, 0, ..., 0)  ( 1i0 ,
1
2 , 0, ..., 0) for some
i0 ∈ {2, 3, ...}. An appeal to WHP yields (0, 1m , 0, ..., 0) < (
1
i0
, 0, 0, ..., 0) for
eachm = 2, 3, .... Now USC entails (0, 0, 0, ..., 0) < ( 1i0 , 0, 0, ..., 0), contradicting
WD.
With respect to the sup topology, {( 1i ,
1
2 , 0, ..., 0)}i converges to (0,
1
2 , 0, ..., 0)
thus USC entails (0, 12 , 0, ..., 0) < (0, 1, 0, ..., 0), contradicting WD. 
Regarding objective (b), we preliminarily explore the intimate relationship
between the Harm Principle and Hammond Equity. This reveals another con-
flict between HP and USC, which bears comparison with the conclusion in
Proposition 3.
Mariotti and Veneziani [15, Prop. 3] proved that when X = R2, WD/SP
and HE imply HP. These authors also proved that when X = [0, 1]n, n > 1,
HP and HE are equivalent in the presence of AN and WD/SP (cf., [14, p.
127]). In fact Lombardi and Veneziani [12, Theorem 1] prove that even WHP
is equivalent to HE in the same circumstances. Proposition 4 below shows
that it is possible to deduce the egalitarian HE from HP if the generations
are treated equally. The argument is exported to the case of infinitely-lived
societies in subsection 4.2 below.
Proposition 4 (Maniquet) Let < be a SWO on X = [0, 1]n for some n ∈
{2, 3, ....}. If < verifies AN and HP then < verifies HE. 2
Proof Suppose the SWO < verifies AN and HP but not HE. Rejecting HE in
the presence of AN ensures that there exist x2 > y2 > y1 > x1 such that x =
(x1, x2, x3, ..., xn)  y = (y1, y2, x3, ..., xn), x,y ∈ [0, 1]n. By reflexivity and
AN, (x1, x2, x3, ..., xn) ∼ (x2, x1, x3, ..., xn). By transitivity, (x2, x1, x3, ..., xn) 
(y1, y2, x3, ..., xn) but now the HP assures (y2, x1, x3, ..., xn)  (x1, y2, x3, ..., xn),
violating AN. 
Proposition 4 permits to derive Corollary 2 below by appealing to our next
Proposition, which relies on the following minimal sensitivity condition for
binary relations < on X = [0, 1]n, n ∈ {2, 3, ....}:
2 This result by F. Maniquet has been communicated to the author by R. Veneziani.
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Axiom S-1 There exists x ∈ X such that x 6< y = (y1, x2, ..., xn) and
y1 > x1 > x2.
Proposition 5 There does not exist any SWR < on X = [0, 1]n, n ∈ {2, 3, ....},
satisfying S-1, HE, and RUSC. 3
Proof By contradiction. Define y(k) according to: y
(k)
i = xi if i = 1, 3, 4, ..., n,
y
(k)
2 = x2 +
1
k . With respect to the sup topology, y
(k) converges to x. For each
k > 1x1−x2 , HE entails y
(k) < y because y1 > x1 = y
(k)





This means x < y due to RUSC, contradicting the assumption. 
Corollary 2 There does not exist any SWO < on X = [0, 1]n, n ∈ {2, 3, ....},
satisfying S-1, AN, HP and RUSC.
Proof By Proposition 4, < verifies HE. Now Proposition 5 applies. 
Our last result in this regard replicates Corollary 2 in terms of IBP and
the following minimal sensitivity condition for orderings < on X = [0, 1]n,
n ∈ {2, 3, ....}:
Axiom S-2 There exists x ∈ X such that there are x2 > x1 > y1 with
x  y = (y1, x2, ..., xn).
Proposition 6 There does not exist any SWO < on X = [0, 1]n, n ∈
{2, 3, ....}, satisfying S-2, AN, IBP, and RLSC.
Proof By contradiction. Define x(k) ∈ X according to: x(k)i = xi if i =
1, 3, 4, ..., n, x
(k)
2 = x2 − 1k . With respect to the sup topology, x
(k) converges
to x. Thus there is k0 such that x
(k)  y when k > k0, due to RLSC. Se-
lect m > k0 such that x2 − 1m > y1. Therefore (x1, x2 −
1
m , x3, ..., xn) 
(y1, x2, x3, ..., xn).
By reflexivity and AN, (x2 − 1m , x1, x3, ..., xn) ∼ (x1, x2 −
1
m , x3, ..., xn)
therefore (x2 − 1m , x1, x3, ..., xn)  (y1, x2, x3, ..., xn). Now an appeal to IBP
yields (x2, x1, x3, ..., xn)  (x1, x2, x3, ..., xn), contradicting AN. 
Remark 3 The interested reader can mimick the proof of Proposition 6 in
order to give a direct argument for Corollary 2 that circumvents Propositions
4 and 5. And alternatively, it is possible to mimick the proof of Proposition 4 in
order to prove that AN and IBP entail a ‘dual’ of HE. 4 From such implication,
Proposition 6 follows easily too.
3 Observe that Axiom S-1 holds under e.g., WD/SP. Also, recall that RUSC and USC
(resp., RLSC and LSC) coincide in this setting.
4 Such dual property is sometimes used to characterise the leximax. See, e.g., d’Aspremont
[7, pp. 56-57].
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We can say a few more words about differences in the analysis under
WHP/WIBP. These variations make the axioms more distant from standard
invariance axioms, with which there is otherwise a contiguity, and their libe-
ral content is even clearer since they emphasise the negative prescriptions of
HP/IBP. Our conclusions in general depend on the specification of the non-
interference axioms. Consider the following example:
Example 1 Define a representable SWO < on [0, 1]n by the utility u(x) =
card{i : xi > 12}. When n = 2, < satisfies AN, RUSC, WHP, WIBP, S-1
(since y = (1, 0)  ( 13 , 0) = x with y1 > x1 > x2 = y2) and S-2 (since
x = ( 23 , 1)  (0, 1) = y with x2 = y2 > x1 > y1), but not HE (since x =
(1, 0)  ( 13 ,
1
4 ) = y). The same is true when n > 2.
Example 1 proves that the impossibility in Corollary 2 is overturned, and
the conclusion of Maniquet’s Proposition 4 is no longer valid, when WHP
replaces HP. Analogously, we can assure that the impossibility in Proposition
6 is overturned if IBP is relaxed to WIBP by appealing to the SWO defined
from the utility v(x) = card{i : xi > 12}.
4.2 The case of an infinitely-lived society
Most of the arguments in the preceding subsection carry forward to the case
of infinite sequences of utilities. We proceed to discuss the details.
Lombardi and Veneziani [13, Theorem 5] take advantage of their charac-
terizations of the standard leximin/leximax relations that compare infinite
streams, in order to prove that there is no weakly complete SWR that ver-
ifies AN, SP, a Strong Preference Continuity axiom, HP, and IBP. Here we
complement their analysis by appealing to topological continuity instead.
Firstly we study if semicontinuity imposes restrictions to non-interference
in the presence of efficiency. In order to convert Propositions 2 and 3 into
statements for infinitely-lived societies, neither the completeness axiom nor
WD are needed in full capacity. We just need to refer to RWD and the following
axiom:
Axiom MC (Minimal Completeness). 5 If x,y ∈ X, there is T > 1 such
that (1xT ,T+1 y) 6= y ⇒ (1xT ,T+1 y) < y or y < (1xT ,T+1 y).
With respect to RWD and its reinforcements, a reduction to the case of
Propositions 2 and 3 yields Proposition 7 below:
Proposition 7 There is no reflexive SWR on X = [0, 1]N that verifies MC,
RWD, IBP (res., HP), and RLSC (resp., RUSC).
Proof Suppose < verifies MC, RWD, IBP (res., HP), and RLSC (resp., RUSC).
Define a binary relationR on [0, 1]2 according to: (x, y)R(x′, y′) iff (x, y, 0con) <
5 See Lombardi and Veneziani [12, Section 4.1] for a prior use of this axiom.
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(x′, y′, 0con). It is straightforward to check that it is complete because < is re-
flexive and MC, and that it verifies IBP (res., HP), WD, and RLSC (resp.,
RUSC). This contradicts Proposition 2 (resp., Proposition 3). 
As has been said, the formal incompatibility between HP-IBP and efficiency
properties implying RWD does not remain under WP, since W(x) = xi pro-
duces a M, WP, HEF (if i > 1), HP, IBP, representable and continuous w.r.t.
the sup topology (but dictatorial) evaluation. Dictatorship might be avoided
by imposing the equal treatment of the generations. This leads us to the ques-
tion if non-interference is possible under AN in the presence of continuity. We
proceed to check that the answer is essentially negative: The reader can easily
borrow the arguments from Proposition 4 to Proposition 6 in order to produce
twin statements for infinitely-lived societies, namely Propositions 8 and 9 be-
low. They appeal to the following adapted versions of axioms S-1 and S-2 for
orderings < on X = [0, 1]N:
Axiom S-1′ There exists x ∈ X eventually constant such that there are
y1 > x1 > x2 for which y = (y1, 2x)  x.
Axiom S-2′ There exists x ∈ X eventually constant such that there are
x2 > x1 > y1 for which x  y = (y1, 2x).
Proposition 8 Let < be a SWO on X = [0, 1]N. If < verifies AN and HP
then < verifies HE.
Example 1 inspires our next example, which shows that we can not relax
HP to WHP in Proposition 8 even if WIBP is guaranteed too:
Example 2 Consider the SWO < on [0, 1]N defined by: x < y if and only if
either card{i : xi > 12} is infinite or (card{i : xi >
1
2} is finite and card{i :
xi > 12} > card{i : yi >
1
2}). This SWO verifies AN, WHP, WIBP, S-1
′
(since y = (1, 0con)  ( 13 , 0con) = x with y1 > x1 > x2) and S-2
′ (since
x = ( 23 , 1, 0con)  (0, 1, 0con) = y with x2 > x1 > y1), but not HE (since
x = (1, 0con)  ( 13 ,
1
4 , 0con) = y). Note that it does not verify RUSC.
Proposition 9 There is no SWO < on X = [0, 1]N satisfying either of the
following sets of conditions:
(a) S-1′, AN, HP, and RUSC, or
(b) S-2′, AN, IBP, and RLSC.
With respect to Proposition 7, Proposition 9 brings out an incompatibility
under a technical condition (a very mild version of RWD) when AN and further
consistency are imposed. Proposition 9 is reexplored in Subsection 4.3 below.
4.3 Revisiting the analysis under a cardinal perspective
In order to explore some routes of escape to the generalized impossibilities that
stem from semicontinuity, we now check for possible changes in the analysis
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above when well-beings are universally comparable and cardinally measurable.
We consider the following cardinal forms of the non-interference principles
whose implications we have inspected thus far:
Axiom IEHP (Individual Equal Harm Principle). Suppose x,y ∈ X are
eventually coincident and x  y. Consider two streams x′,y′ such that: for
some i ∈ N, j 6= i implies x′j = xj and y′j = yj . If x′i = xi − ε and y′i = yi − ε




This axiom is a direct descendant of the Harm Principle thus it captures
a related liberal spirit. A similar defense holds for its counterpart:
Axiom IEBP (Individual Equal Benefit Principle). Antecedent as in IEHP,
thesis as follows: If x′i = xi + ε and y
′





implies x′  y′.
The respective versions for finite-length streams are the same except that
the restriction of the conclusion to eventually coincident vectors does not apply.
We do not need to explore the context of a finite society in depth because
to the effect of comparing the ordinal and cardinal positions, summing up the
components is a WD/SP, AN, IEHP, IEBP, continuous with respect to the
sup topology evaluation. In fact Mariotti and Veneziani [16] state a property
in line with the conjunction of adapted versions of IEHP and IEBP, namely,
Uniform Additive Non-Interference. Then they prove that SWOs that verify
SP, AN, and Uniform Additive Non-Interference only deviate from the utili-
tarian ordering in comparisons between indifferent elements for the utilitarian
rule.
Let us therefore focus on infinitely-lived societies.
1) Proposition 10 below proves that if a SWO is AN and IEHP then it
verifies the following Weak Pigou-Dalton transfer principle (cf., Hara et al.
[11, p. 185]).
Axiom WPDT (Weak Pigou-Dalton transfer principle). If x,y ∈ X are
such that there is ε > 0 with xj = yj + ε > yj > yk > xk = yk − ε for some
j, k ∈ N, and xt = yt when j 6= t 6= k, then y < x.
Proposition 10 Let < be a SWO on X = [0, 1]N. If < verifies AN and IEHP
then < verifies WPDT.
Proof Let x,y ∈ X be such that there is ε > 0 with xj = yj + ε > yj > yk >
xk = yk − ε for some j, k ∈ N, and xt = yt when j 6= t 6= k. By contradiction,
assume x  y. Due to AN we can fix j = 1, k = 2 thus 3x = 3y, and we also
get x  (y2, y1, 3x).
Consider the vectors x′ = (x1 − ε, 2x) and y′ = (y2 − ε, y1, 3x). They
are obtained from x and (y2, y1, 3x) by reducing the endowment of their
respective presents by ε. Since x1 > y2 by assumption, we obtain x1−ε > y2−ε
thus IEHP yields x′ = (x1 − ε, 2x) = (y1, 2x)  y′ = (y2 − ε, y1, 3x) =
(x2, y1, 3x) ∼ (y1, x2, 3x), an absurd. 
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If we further add M to the assumptions of Proposition 10, then we also
obtain HEF by Asheim et al. [3, Proposition 3].
2) A possibility result emerges from Proposition 7 by replacing HP/IBP
with their cardinal variants above:
Proposition 11 There are representable SWOs on X = [0, 1]N that verify
SP, IEHP and IEBP, RUSC and RLSC. There are reflexive and transitive
SWRs on X = [0, 1]N that verify SP, AN, IEHP and IEBP.
Proof This reduces to checking that discounted utilitarianism agrees with both
IEHP and IEBP, as well as being SP, RUSC and RLSC, and representable.
Besides, the utilitarian overtaking and catching up criteria also satisfy IEHP
and IEBP, AN, and SP, the cost of anonymity being completeness. 6 
Thus by contrast with the case of general non-interference, utilitarianism
can be reconciled with a cardinal approach to these principles.
3) It is less obvious that the conclusion in Proposition 9 does not vary if
IEHP replaces HP in case (a), and IEBP replaces IBP in case (b). We prove
this fact by showing that for infinitely-lived societies, the equal treatment of
all generations is incompatible with cardinal non-interference principles un-
der standard semicontinuity and very mild efficiency. We use the following
strengthenings of axioms S-1′ and S-2′, which in fact can be rephrased to re-
semble more the originals although we believe that the technical effort does
not pay off. Observe that S-1′′ and S-2′′ are weaker than RWD too.
Axiom S-1′′ There exist y1 > x1 > x2 for which y = (y1, (x2)con)  x =
(x1, (x2)con).
Axiom S-2′′ There exist x2 > x1 > y1 for which x = (x1, (x2)con)  y =
(y1, (x2)con).
Proposition 12 There is no SWO on X = [0, 1]N satisfying either of:
(a) S-1′′, AN, IEHP, and RUSC, or
(b) S-2′′, AN, IEBP, and RLSC.
Proof We prove case (b) by contradiction. Suppose < is a SWO that verifies
AN, IEBP, RLSC, and condition (2′′). Thus we have x2 > x1 > y1 such that
x = (x1, (x2)con)  y = (y1, (x2)con). Let us denote m = x1 − y1.
We now define the following sequence of streams: for each n sufficiently
large,
x(n) = (x1 −
m
n
, n......., xn −
m
n
, n+1x) ∈ X
6 In fact Asheim and Tungodden [4, Section 5] prove that a property with a formal
similarity to the conjunction of IEHP and IEBP, namely 2-Generation Unit Comparability
(or 2UC), permits to characterize the overtaking and catching up criteria. However that
invariance property incorporates a behavior that has a strongly utilitarian component and
cannot be justified from a liberal perspective alone.
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(one only needs x1 − mn , x2 −
m
n ∈ [0, 1]). With respect to the sup topology,
x(n) converges to x. Thus there is n′ ∈ N such that x(n)  y when n > n′,
due to RLSC.
We proceed to use a recursive argument on (x1−mn′ , n
′
......., xn′−mn′ , n′+1x) 
(y1, 2x). By appealing to IBP we compare the result of increasing their endow-
ments to the present by mn′ (which utilises x1 > y1 +
m






























Again we appeal to IBP in order to compare the result of increasing their
endowments to the present by mn′ (which now utilises x2 > y1+
2m
n′ or x2−y1 >
m > 2mn′ because by the recursive assumption 2 6 n
′). We then obtain


























Now we repeat the argument until we reach the following conclusion after n′
steps, which ends the proof:
x = (x1, x2, ......, xn′ , n′+1x)  (y1 +
n′m
n′
, 2x) = x
The other instance of the statement is proven by mimicking the proof
above. 
Remark 4 Continuing our discussion in point 2) above in this Section, Asheim
and Tungodden [4, Propositions 4 and 5] in particular prove the existence of
reflexive and transitive relations satisfying SP, AN, 2UC (see footnote 6) and
two respective forms of preference continuity. As a matter of fact catching up
(resp., overtaking) not only verifies SP, AN, 2UC, and Strong (resp., Weak)
Preference Continuity, but also IEHP and IEBP. This speaks for the strong
restrictions that weak specifications of semicontinuity in the usual sense impose
to anonymous and equal harm/benefit behaviors.
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5 Conclusions and discussion
We have investigated whether separate non-interference properties (Harm Prin-
ciple and Individual Benefit Principle, as well as their cardinal variants) are
compatible with Paretian relations both in finitely- and infinitely-lived soci-
eties. Our analysis adds to prior studies when no further properties are pre-
sumed, but we also extend the inspection in order to consider relaxed versions
of topological semicontinuities. Our results have the following implications:
1. In the case of finite societies, full non-interference leads to dictatorship
when Weak Pareto is guaranteed. We have proved that the situation is quite
the opposite when the horizon is infinite (cf., Section 3): Explicit SWOs can be
designed that implement enough efficiency (in the form of M plus WP), mini-
mal equity (in the form of HEF), as well as HP plus IBP and non-dictatorships
by the present and by the future.
2. If we are interested in imposing standard semicontinuity then we have
clarified the extent of the conflict among non-interference principles and Pareto
efficiency (cf., Section 4). We proved that renouncing anonymity is not a es-
cape to the incompatibility that arises from the characterizations of the lex-
imin/leximax in the finite context. In the same finite context, if we keep the
equal treatment of the generations then a single suitable Paretian comparison
yields a conflict. This confirms that for orderings of finite streams, anonymity
and HP/IBP are almost universally incompatible in the presence of standard
semicontinuity. The analysis translates faithfully to infinitely-long streams of
utilities. In this case we define cardinal variants of HP/IBP and prove that the
conclusion as to keeping anonymity and separate non-interference principles
remains negative for semicontinuous SWOs.
3. Asheim and Zuber [6] have introduced continuity axioms that are worth
considering because they are compatible with their version of leximin over
infinite streams, which is complete and strongly anonymous. Perhaps one could
obtain complete leximin or leximax criteria using (restricted versions of) HP
or IBP, AN, RWP, and such continuity axioms. But this would be the topic of
another paper. 7
4. We have refrained from introducing the assumption of numerical repre-
sentability in our analysis. Nevertheless it seems interesting to report on the
following related result (cf., Alcantud and Garćıa-Sanz [1, Subsection 3.3]):
There is no social welfare function on X = [0, 1]N that verifies RWD and HP
(resp., IBP). This is to say, RWD evaluations of the streams must exert some
interference (penalising both adverse and favorable changes) on the affairs of
particular generations.
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